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This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1985.

El reciente estudio de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) de las telecomunicaciones en México (OCDE, 2012a) establece dos puntos principales. Primero, el desempeño del sector, que si bien ha mejorado se mantiene por debajo de las metas alcanzables. Segundo, las causas del déficit de desempeño son la competencia insuficiente y la regulación ineficaz. El presente artículo se enfoca en dos cuestiones. La primera es el desempeño relativo de la industria de las telecomunicaciones en México. La segunda es si la regulación de las telecomunicaciones en México se aparta o no de las mejores prácticas internacionales y si las recomendaciones de la OCDE son o no sensatas. Las principales conclusiones del presente artículo son las siguientes. En cuanto al desempeño, el análisis de la OCDE es correcto en términos generales y las críticas al estudio de la OCDE que hacen Hausman y Ros son mayormente infundadas. En cuanto a las políticas, el análisis de la OCDE de la regulación en México refleja las conclusiones de la investigación académica y las prácticas de países pares en los que el desempeño de la industria de las telecomunicaciones es superior al de México

ABSTRACTTelevision rights are the largest component of revenues for major sports in large, rich nations. Among these nations, the market structure for rights varies due to different competition policies toward sports and television. This essay examines how game coverage, revenues, and competitive balance are affected by competition in commercial television and sales of rights. It argues that consumers are better off if television is competitive and leagues do not centralize rights sales. We conclude that centralization of rights sales does not improve competitive balance or benefit financially weak teams. Finally, while digital telecommunications are making television competitive, ending centralization of sales by leagues requires policy intervention.

Television rights are the largest component of revenues for major sports in large, rich nations. Among these nations, the market structure for rights varies due to different competition policies toward sports and television. This essay examines how game coverage, revenues, and competitive balance are affected by competition in commercial television and sales of rights. It argues that consumers are better off if television is competitive and leagues do not centralize rights sales. We conclude that centralization of rights sales does not improve competitive balance or benefit financially weak teams. Finally, while digital telecommunications are making television competitive, ending centralization of sales by leagues requires policy intervention.

A commonly observed characteristic of risk regulation policy is the absence of coherent prioritization of risks and inconsistencies in the stringency of controls on risks that are regulated. The purpose of this article is to examine the roots of this problem in the way both citizens and their elected representatives deal with uncertainties associated with catastrophic risks, why elected politicians respond to this problem in constructing regulatory institutions that are prone to inconsistency, and whether various proposals to reform the regulatory process would be likely to improve its performance. The main conclusions are that most reform proposals are strongly inconsistent with democratic responsiveness, which is the most important principle that elected officials use in designing programs, and that the only plausible means for making regulatory policy more coherent is to increase the resources of regulatory agencies so as to give them greater control over the public agenda in risk policy.

The common absence of coherent prioritization of risks & inconsistencies in the stringency of controls on risks that are regulated are examined, locating the problem in the way both citizens & elected representatives deal with uncertainties associated with catastrophic risks, why elected politicians respond to this problem in constructing regulatory institutions that are prone to inconsistency, & whether various proposals to reform the regulatory process would be likely to improve its performance. It is concluded that most reform proposals are strongly inconsistent with democratic responsiveness -- seen as the most important principle that elected officials use in designing programs -- & that the only plausible means for making regulatory policy more coherent is to increase the resources of regulatory agencies so as to give them greater control over the public agenda in risk policy. Adapted from the source document.